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Abstract: Fair exchange protocols play an important role in application areas such as e-
commerce where protocol participants require mutual guarantees that a transaction involving 
exchange of items has taken place in a specific manner. A protocol is fair if no protocol 
participant can gain any advantage over an honest participant by misbehaving. In addition, such 
a protocol is fault tolerant if the protocol can ensure that an honest participant does not suffer 
any loss of fairness despite any failures of the participant’s node. This paper presents a family of 
fair exchange protocols for two participants under a variety of assumptions concerning 
participant misbehaviour, node reliability and message delays. While the paper considers, in line 
with other known protocols, that a dishonest user can control the protocol execution subject to 
known cryptographic assumptions, it also considers a class of dishonest users whose abilities to 
abuse are restricted. The restricted-abuse assumption results in a round-optimal (2-round) 
protocol that eliminates any need for an “after-the-fact” dispute resolution, using traditional 
symmetric keys and the RSA signatures. The paper also indicates how this assumption can be 
realised through the use of smart cards. Concerning the node reliability, the development 
presented here shows how a non-fault tolerant version of a protocol can be made crash-tolerant, 
thereby highlighting issues that need to be addressed in such transformation. The third 
dimension concerns the case of the bound on message delays being known or unknown. 
Keywords and Phrases:  Fair Exchange, Security, Smartcards, Fault tolerance, Distributed 
Systems. 
1. Introduction 
Fair exchange protocols play an important role in application areas where protocol participants require 
mutual guarantees that an exchange of data items has taken place in a specific manner. An exchange is 
fair if a dishonest participant cannot gain any advantage over honest participants by misbehaving. 
Practical schemes for fair exchange require a trusted party that essentially plays the role of a notary in the 
paper based schemes. (Gradual Exchange protocols [BGMR90] which do not need a trusted party have 
high communication overhead.) Two-participant fair-exchange protocols that make use of a trusted third 
party have been studied extensively in the literature (e.g., [ZG97, PSW98, ASW98]); these protocols 
maintain fairness even if the dishonest participant can tamper with the protocol execution in an 
unrestricted (malicious) manner. They however require that an honest participant’s node execute the 
protocol correctly – suffering no failures. In other words, fault tolerant fair exchange protocols have not 
been studied adequately. A fair exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures no loss of fairness to an 
honest participant even if the participant’s node experiences failures of the assumed type. 
In this paper we develop a number of fair exchange protocols under a variety of assumptions concerning 
user misbehaviour, node failures and communication delays. Our development is systematic: we begin by 
classifying dishonest participants into restricted abusers (they cannot tamper with the protocol execution 
in an arbitrary manner) and unrestricted or malicious abusers, and the communication model into 
synchronous, where a known bound on message delays exists, and asynchronous; we develop the very 
first protocol under the most constrained set of assumptions: restricted abuser, synchronous 
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communication and no fault tolerance. We then relax the restricted abuser assumption to malicious 
abuser and then the synchrony assumption into asynchrony. The resulting family of non-fault-tolerant fair 
exchange protocols is then transformed into a family of crash-tolerant protocols.  
A major advantage of our approach is that it enables a reader to gain a deeper understanding of the 
impact of a given set of assumptions on the problem of fair exchange; it also highlights the relationships 
that exist between fairness, fault tolerance and communication delay assumptions. In particular, we show 
that the use of (optimistic) message logging for crash tolerance is more subtle than that suggested in 
[LNJ00] - the first paper to consider fault-tolerance and fair-exchange. We first describe the problem and 
the underlying system models (section 2), and then develop a family of non-fault-tolerant protocols 
(section 3), followed by their crash-tolerant counterparts (section 4). In section 5, we describe the use of 
smart cards in restricting dishonest behaviour. Section 6 identifies issues that need to be considered when 
message logging is used for crash tolerance and concludes the paper.  
2. System Models and the Problem Description  
We consider two mutually untrusting users, UA and UB, who have data items IA and IB respectively that 
are unknown to the other user prior to the exchange. User Ux, X ∈{A, B}, intends to send Ix in return for 
receiving IY, where Y ∈{A, B} and Y ≠ X. Px denotes the process that executes an exchange protocol on 
behalf of user Ux on his node Nx. Our distributed exchange system (Figure 1) has a third node hosting the 
trusted third party (TTP) process. The exchange must preserve fairness as well as non-repudiation: a user 
gets irrefutable evidence of the actions performed by his process (to guard against the other user’s false 
denial of the occurrence of an action or event).  
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Figure 1. The Fair-Exchange System. 
2.1. Classifying User Misbehaviour 
Generally, the problem of fair exchange is addressed in a context where a dishonest user, say UB, totally 
controls the behaviour of PB and tries to undermine every attempt to ensure fairness and non-repudiation. 
We term those dishonest users as malicious abusers and distinguish such users from a class of restricted 
abusers: a dishonest user is said to be a restricted abuser if he is unable to obtain the values of variables 
or procedures contained in a piece of (binary) code which his local process receives from the TTP and 
uses during protocol execution. Say, user UB is a restricted abuser and the TTP gives PB a piece of code 
ΠB that contains, say, some secret encryption keys. By our definition, UB cannot obtain the keys in ΠB by 
visual inspection or through a trace analysis even after PB has executed UB. The definition does not 
however restrict the ability of UB to delay, block, inspect, or tamper with any message which an 
execution of ΠB generates or is destined to receive. 
There are many ways to realise our notion of a restricted abuser.  Code obfuscation, used in software 
watermarking and tamper-proofing (see [CT00] for a survey), is one approach. However, a totally secure, 
code-obfuscation is impossible to achieve [BGI01]: there exists a non-zero probability that an obfuscated 
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program ceases to be a virtual black box to an abuser. Thus, relying on code-obfuscation involves making 
assumptions on the abilities of dishonest users. An alternative approach is to have each PX receive the 
TTP code ΠX via a secure channel and execute it in a tamper-proof part of the user node. We observe 
here that there is much interest in developing tamper-proof computing subsystems by the industry led 
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, TCPA [TCPA01]. In section 5, we describe how smartcards can 
be used to provide such tamper-proof computing subsystems. So, we believe that developing fair-
exchange protocols under the restricted abuser model is of practical interest; in addition, it exposes the 
benefits that the model has to offer.  
2.2. Classifying Node Behaviour 
A fair-exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures that fairness is preserved to an honest participant 
despite the participant’s node suffers failures of the assumed type. In other words, an honest user does 
not suffer loss of fairness when his node is unreliable. We consider two types of node behaviour: 
Reliable: An honest user’s node never fails. 
Crash-recovery: An honest user’s node fails by stopping to function (crash); it recovers within some 
finite (but unknown) time after a crash and may crash again after its recovery. An honest user’s node has 
access to a stable store whose contents survive the node crash. 
When a user node is regarded to be reliable, the cause of any node crash is attributed to the user who has 
misbehaved and is therefore not entitled to any fairness guarantee. This is the traditional view taken in 
the TTP-based protocols (e.g., [ZG97, PSW98, ASW98]) which are therefore not fault-tolerant (see 
[LNJ00]). In line with the existing, non-fault-tolerant protocols, the TTP is assumed to be reliable and 
secure against intrusions and Trojan horses.  
2.3. Classifying Communication Delays 
Communication between correctly functioning processes is assumed to be resilient to network failures: a 
message loss is tolerated by retransmission and a message corruption is detected using encryption and 
reduced to a message loss. A network intruder is therefore assumed to be a restricted abuser: a message 
in transit is a black box to him; he cannot modify it and have it undetected at the destination. He can only 
delay a message from being accepted at a destination. We consider two types of network intrusion: 
intruder gives up delaying a given message transmission after a known period of time or after some 
unknown finite time, leading to two models: in the synchronous model, correct processes exchange 
messages with delays bounded by a known D; in the asynchronous model, D is finite but unknown. 
2.4. Properties of a fair exchange Protocol  
A user is honest if he makes no attempt to modify the behaviour of a protocol process except through the 
permitted operations. 
Termination: Any execution of the protocol terminates for an honest user UX. Termination for an honest 
UX can be either a normal termination in which PX delivers IY to UX or an exceptional termination where 
PX informs UX that the exchange is unsuccessful. 
No_Loss_Of_Fairness: If PX of honest UX terminates exceptionally, UY does not receive IX. 
Non-repudiation: when PX delivers IY to honest UX, it also provides irrefutable evidence against any false 
denial on IY having been sent by UY. 
The above properties are met trivially if PA and PB terminate always exceptionally.  
Non-Triviality: If UA and UB are honest, both are guaranteed to have normal termination. 
Non-triviality is easy to guarantee for the synchronous, non-fault-tolerant case. When the fair-exchange 
protocol is deterministic (not probabilistic) in nature, honesty of both the users alone is not sufficient to 
guarantee non-triviality for the case of crash-recovery nodes and synchronous communication, as well for 
the case of asynchronous communication. The reasons for this inability are as follows. In crash-recovery 
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model, the bound on the time taken by an honest user node to recover from a crash is unknown and a 
dishonest user may never allow his node to recover. So, a correctly functioning process (of an honest user 
or the TTP) that is waiting too long for a message from a user process cannot resolve whether the latter is 
honest and its message is unduly delayed due to a crash or is dishonest and is not going to transmit the 
expected message; similarly, in the asynchronous model, it cannot resolve whether the user process from 
whom a message is expected is honest and its message is still in transit or is dishonest and the message 
will not be transmitted at all. (Readers familiar with the FLP impossibility result [FLP85] may find these 
arguments remarkably similar.) Therefore, meeting the termination property would mean that an 
execution of the protocol may have to terminate exceptionally even if both users are honest. Therefore, 
the necessary condition for ensuring non-triviality is that the honest users be willing to re-execute the 
protocol after every exceptional termination; the sufficient condition differs with the combination of 
assumptions and is stated below: there must be an execution in which 
(i) user nodes do not crash, for the case of crash-recovery nodes and synchronous communication; 
(ii) message delays do not increase, for the case of reliable nodes and asynchronous communication; and, 
(i) and (ii), for the case of crash-recovery nodes and asynchronous communication.  
2.5. Assumptions, Notations and the Exchange Preliminaries  
In all our protocols, the TTP, assumed to be secure and reliable, is used to set-up the context for, and to 
initiate, the actual exchange. We make the following additional assumptions. 
 A1: Processing within correctly functioning nodes is synchronous: delays for task scheduling and 
processing are bounded by a known constant. 
A2:  The clocks of the TTP and the functioning nodes of honest users are synchronised to real-time 
within a known bound which, for simplicity, is assumed to be zero. A recovering node receives the 
current time from its user. 
2.5.1. Notations  
M: a message; 
VA (VB): procedure to verify if IA (IB) satisfies its description ΣA (ΣB) advertised by UA (UB). 
eK(M): encryption of M using key K; 
SigX(M): signature of PX, X ∈{A, B}, on M using the private key of UX; 
SigTTP(M): TTP’s signature on M. Signatures are both signer- and content-dependent, and are verifiable 
using the signer’s public key. 
L: a label that identifies a given exchange; 
N: a large random number (nonce) generated securely by TTP to uniquely identify messages of a given 
execution of the protocol for a given exchange; and,  
H: one-way and collision-resistant hash function: it is not feasible to compute from H(N), N nor another 
N’ such that H(N) = H(N’). 
 Πx: contents of a message sent by the TTP to Px to initate the exchange phase. 
When a party Z ∈{A, B, TTP} sends a message M it also includes SigZ(M) as the evidence of origin for 
M. A recipient accepts a received M only if the accompanying SigZ(M) is found authentic. For brevity, 
we will not make the details of this verification explicit and a received message will only refer to a 
message received with an authentic evidence of origin; further the pair {M, SigZ(M)} will simply be 
written as M which will be indicated by its significant fields.  
2.5.2. Exchange Preliminaries 
All our protocols are structured into two phases: the start-up phase followed by the exchange phase when 
the actual exchange of promised data items takes place. During the start-up phase, the following three 
steps are carried out: 
Step 0.1: Each UX approaches a trusted authority TAX to generate a verification procedure using which 
any party can verify if a data item I satisfies specification ΣX. For example, if IB is a piece of software S, 
UB must approach a software licensing authority (trusted by UA) who evaluates S against the specification 
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ΣB that UB advertised. If satisfied, the authority computes an evidence of evaluation EB = H(S); VB is then 
generated as a program which contains EB and evaluates the predicate EB = H(I) when invoked to verify a 
data item I. Similarly, if IA is an electronic cheque, VA should similarly be generated by a Bank for the 
amount specified in ΣA. Using the conventional notations, the step can be expressed as: 
UA → TAA: (IA, ΣA);  
TAA → UA: {VA, ΣA, SigTA_A(VA, ΣA)};  
UB → TAB: (IB, ΣB); 
TAB → UB: {VB, ΣB, SigTA_B(VB, ΣB)};  
Note that our protocols do not require both TAA and TAB to be the TTP itself. 
Step 0.2: Users exchange their {V, Σ, SigTA(V, Σ)}, decide on the TTP and on a (future) time TEX when 
the TTP should initiate the exchange phase. 
Step 0.3: UA → TTP: (A, B, TEX, {VA, ΣA}, {VB, ΣB}, rttAB): similarly, UB → TTP: (A, B, TEX, {VA, ΣA}, 
{VB, ΣB}, rttBA). The last field rttXY is UX’s estimation of the round trip time between its node and NY.  
Upon receiving messages sent in step 0.3, the TTP verifies whether all fields except the last one are 
identical. If so, the TTP decides on a unique L for the exchange if the exchange is new; generates a nonce 
N for the exchange phase and records N in a variable active_run#(L)= N. If the exchange is not new, it 
only generates a new nonce and records it in active_run#(L). It then sends ΠB to NA and ΠB to NB which 
include the parameters L and H(N) which are used to identify messages of a given execution. The nature 
and the complete contents of Π’s sent by TTP depend on the exchange phase of the protocol for a chosen 
combination of various assumptions discussed earlier. 
2.5.3. TTP Involvement 
A protocol is said to keep TTP offline if it is possible for honest user processes to achieve normal 
termination without interacting with TTP after the exchange phase is initiated. Such a protocol is also 
called optimistic in the literature. If TTP is not off-line, it is said to be on-line. 
A protocol is said to use a state-keeping TTP if it requires the TTP to respond to messages from user 
processes for an unspecified amount of time; the protocol is said to use a state-relinquishing TTP if it 
requires the TTP only for a specified duration after the exchange phase has been initiated. From cost 
point of view, TTP is preferred to be offline and state-relinquishing. 
3. Non-Fault-Tolerant Fair Exchange Protocols 
3.1. Restricted Abuser, Synchronous Communication (P1) 
Protocol Principles and Outline 
The TTP sends a code ΠA to PA and ΠB to PB. PA and PB perform the exchange phase of the protocol P1 
by executing the code given to them. Embedded in ΠX are L, H(N), VX, ∆, and keys KA and KB, each with 
TTP’s evidence of origin. ∆ is set to D (the known bound on message delays), KA and KB are symmetric 
and random session keys. When a dishonest UX is only a restricted abuser, he cannot obtain KA and KB 
from ΠX nor undetectably modify VX embedded within ΠX. However, UX can delay, block, inspect, or 
tamper with any message PX generates or is destined to receive while it executes ΠX. 
On executing ΠA, PA first verifies whether IA (input by UA) passes VA embedded within ΠA. Only if IA 
passes the verification, PA continues the execution: it encrypts the verified IA using KA, forms a message 
MA and encrypts MA with KB. The encrypted MA, like all messages sent by PA, contains a signature 
generated using the private key of UA and is sent to PB. (Any message without valid signature is ignored 
and hence assumed not ‘received’ by a destination.) PB decrypts the received MA, and if the contents are 
correct, it sends an acknowledgement AckB(A) to PA. PB similarly sends MB to, and expects to receive 
AckA(B) from, PA. The message exchange between PA and PB are depicted in Figure 2, where a process 
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sending a message shown along an out-going arrow is conditional upon that process having received the 
messages shown along all incoming arrows. PX, after receiving ΠX, starts executing both the rounds 
concurrently: send MX and wait for AckY(X) while waiting for MY before AckX(Y) can be sent; a timeout 
of 2∆ is used to avoid indefinite waiting.  
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Figure 2. Protocol P1: Message exchange rounds between user processes. 
Table 1 summarises the messages used and the intended direction of their flow. A message is indicated 
by its significant fields, the first three fields will be: the label L, the sender, and H(N). Note that the first 
and the third message fields uniquely refer to a given execution. 
ΦA = eKA(IA) ΦB = eKB(IB) 
MA =  eKB(L, A,  H(N), ΦA); A → B MB =  eKA(L, B,  H(N), ΦB); B → A 
AckA(B) = (L, A, H(N), H(MB), My_ack); A → B AckB(A) = (L, B, H(N), H(MA), My_ack); B → A 
ResA = (L, A, H(N), MA, MB, Resolve_request); 
A → TTP 
ResB = (L, B, H(N), MB, MA, Resolve_request); 
B → TTP 
ReqA = (L, A, H(N), MA, Abort_request); A → 
TTP 
ReqB =  (L, B, H(N), MB, Abort_request); B → 
TTP 
MTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), MB, My_ack); TTP  → 
A  
MTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), MA, My_ack); TTP  →  
B  
AbortTTP(A) = (L, TTP, H(N), Abort_granted, 
A); TTP  → A  
AbortTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), Abort_granted, B); 
TTP  →  B  
Table 1. Description of messages used in Protocol P1. 
The condition on PA (PB) for computing IB (IA) from MB (MA) is: both MB (MA) and AckB(A) (AckA(B)) 
must be received within 2∆ time after receiving ΠA (ΠB) from TTP. If PA receives only MB (within 2∆ 
time), it asks TTP to resolve the exchange by sending message ResA that contains both MA and the 
received MB. If it receives neither MB nor AckB(A), it requests TTP to abort the exchange by sending 
message ReqA that contains only MA. TTP, having initiated the exchange at its clock time TEX, executes 
the following steps at TEX + 4∆:  
Step T1: if it has received Req from both processes or Res from at least one process, it sets variable 
outcome = resolved and resolves the exchange by sending MTTP(X) to both processes;  
Step T2: if it has received Req from only one process, it sets outcome = aborted and aborts the 
exchange by sending AbortTTP(X) to both processes;  
Step T3:  if it has received no message, it sets variable outcome = unknown; 
Step T4: it terminates (as a state-relinquishing TTP). 
- 7 - 
An honest PA terminates normally by receiving either MB and AckB(A) or MTTP(A); exceptionally by 
receiving AbortTTP(A). The protocol keeps TTP off-line (step T3 above). The four properties of fair-
exchange (Section 2.4) are met by P1 because: (i) dishonest user, say UB, is a restricted abuser, so he 
cannot force PB to deliver IA against the protocol conditions nor can he obtain KA and KB from ΠB; (ii) an 
honest PA sends AckA(B) to PB only if it receives MB in a timely manner; (iii) any message that PA sends 
to TTP reaches before TEX+4∆; and, (iv) TTP’s response, if any, is identical to both PA and PB. 
3.2. Malicious Abuser, Synchronous Communication: Protocol P1.1 
P1.1 is the same as P1 except some messages of the exchange phase have different contents. This is 
because a dishonest user, say UB, can obtain the keys KA and KB in the program ΠB supplied by TTP at 
the start of the exchange phase. The following changes are needed: 
1. ΠA is a message containing all parameters as before except KB: ΠA = (L, H(N), VA, ∆, KA); 
similarly,  ΠB = (L, H(N), VB, ∆, KB). Further, TTP should not have used KA and KB before.  
2. ΠA does not contain KB means that PA cannot encrypt MA with KB (see Table 1). Therefore MA is 
(L, A, H(N), ΦA) and MB is (L, A, H(N), ΦB).  
3. PA includes KA in its AckA(B) so that if PB has both MA and AckA(B) it can terminate normally 
without having to contact TTP. So, AckA(B) of Table 1 becomes (L, A, H(N), H(MB), KA) and 
AckB(A) becomes (L, B, H(N), H(MA), KB). 
4. Finally, MTTP(A) by which TTP instructs PA to resolve the exchange, must contain KB: MTTP(A) = 
(L, TTP, H(N), MB, KB). Also, MTTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), MA, KA). 
Correctness: The arguments for termination and non-triviality remain the same as for P1 since they 
concern only honest user(s). We claim that the arguments for no-loss-of-fairness also hold, due to the 
following additional reason: honest PA releases key KA to PB only if it receives MB in a timely manner. 
The arguments for non-Repudiation are also the same for P1, except that the evidence of origin for KB 
may come from PB (in AckB(A)) as well. 
Remark: Dispute Resolution: Non-repudiation guarantee ensures that when honest PA terminates 
normally, it has evidence that PB sent the item which PA delivered to UA. However, if UB is dishonest, UA 
might find IB not passing the verification test VB which it agreed with UB in the start-up phase. Consider 
this scenario: malicious UB obtains KB from ΠB, generates M’B with authentic evidence of origin but with 
I’B ≠ IB, and transmits M’B in place of MB. Since ΠA does not contain KB (see modification 1 above), PA 
cannot check whether the I’B in the received M’B meets VB at the end of the first round itself (see figure 
2). Since M’B is found to have authentic evidence of origin, it will send AckA(B) that contains KA, thus 
letting PB terminate normally without ever contacting TTP. Only after being delivered of I’B, UA can find 
out that I’B does not pass VB and that UB has been dishonest. 
If UB is a restricted abuser, the above scenario cannot arise: ΠB is tamper-proof relative to the abilities of 
UB and therefore is can contain KA using which PB encrypts MB in P1. Since UB cannot obtain KA, he 
cannot modify MB to M’B and make PA accept M’B. Thus, in P1, what UA receives is guaranteed to be the 
expected one. 
P1.1 only guarantees that PA delivers to an honest UA what a malicious UB actually sent in exchange for 
IA, not necessarily what UB has pledged to send. The TTP can guarantee fairness to UA in such a scenario, 
by contacting the trusted agent TAB employed to generate VB which UA accepted. This corresponds to a 
weaker form of fairness enforcement in the hierarchy of [VPG99]: fairness can only be guaranteed with 
the help of a trusted agent outside the fair-exchange system (figure 1) and without any cooperation from 
UB. Note that the problem of fair-exchange of data items can be reduced into one of fair-exchange of 
digital signatures over an agreed contract, and the contract signing can be achieved through known abuse-
free protocols for fair-exchange of signatures [GJM99, ASW99]. Such an approach also cannot guarantee 
that post-exchange disputes do not arise: if UB, after having signed the contract and taken the digital 
items of UA, refuses to honour his commitment, then fairness can only be enforced after the contract 
exchange. The issue of post-exchange dispute resolution is discussed and addressed in [RR00] and 
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[RRN00] for malicious abusers. The protocols of [RR00] and [RRN00] make use of inverse and 
compatible keys to verify an encrypted item without decrypting it. Using these special types of 
encryption keys, P1.1 can also be modified to ensure that an honest user receives in a normal termination 
only the item he bargained for. The modification is simple and discussed in Appendix A2. It preserves 
the 2-round structure which is provably optimal [PSW98]. The protocol of [RR00], like P1.1, keeps the 
TTP off-line and requires 4 rounds when both users are honest.  
3.3. Restricted and Malicious Abusers, Asynchronous Communication (P1A and P1.1A) 
Protocols P1 and P1.1 are not appropriate for the asynchronous model. Impossibility case: Say, both UA 
and UB are honest. Within 2∆ time after receiving Π from TTP, let PA receive MB and AckB(A), and PB 
receive only MA because AckA(B) was unduly delayed. Let ResB be delayed as well, so it does not reach 
TTP before TEX + 4∆ by which time TTP stops responding to any message related to the execution. 
Honest PB has no fairness and also cannot terminate.  
This impossibility is not surprising as [PSW98] shows that, in the non-fault-tolerant case, there cannot be 
an asynchronous protocol that works with a TTP that is off-line and state-relinquishing, and goes on to 
present a protocol with an off-line and state-keeping TTP. We here present protocols P1A and P1.1A 
with an on-line and state-relinquishing TTP, by deriving them from P1 and P1.1 respectively. The 
derivation is simple: in round 2 (see figure 2), PX sends AckX(Y) to TTP, not to PY; it then waits for 
either MTTP(X) or AbortTTP(X).  
In the start-up phase, TTP should obtain round trip time (rtt) measurements with each PX (as rttA and rttB) 
and estimate 2∆ = maximum{rttA, rttB, rttAB, rttBA}. 
TTP: 
  when (clock = TEX) do { 
send ΠA to PA; send ΠB to PB; Set_of_M M_BagL = { }; 
repeat {receive(M); deposit M in M_BagL;} until clock < TEX+ 4∆; 
 if  (AckA(B)∈ M_BagL and AckB(A) ∈ M_BagL)  
  then {send AckB(A) to PA; send AckA(B) to PB;} // exchange resolved 
  else {send AbortTTP(A) to PA; send AbortTTP(B) to PB;} } /* end do 
 
Figure 3. Pseudo-code for TTP in protocols P1A and P1.1A. 
If honest users re-execute the protocol for a given exchange after every exceptional termination, non-
triviality is guaranteed if there exists an execution in which the message transfer delays between PA, PB 
and TTP do not exceed the ∆ determined by TTP at the start of the exchange phase; i.e., if message 
transfer delays do not increase during an execution.  
4. Crash-Tolerant Fair Exchange Protocols 
This section develops crash-tolerant versions of the protocols of the previous section. 
4.1. Restricted Abuser, Synchronous Communication (P2) 
Two extensions are necessary for protocol P1 to be crash tolerant. Pessimistic (synchronous) 
checkpointing: PX of an honest user logs every received message and check-points its state before the 
received message is processed. Thus, in fig. 2, an honest PX must receive and log the messages of the 
incoming channels before it can send out a message. State-keeping TTP: in step T4, the TTP does not 
terminate the execution, but continues to operate depending on the value of outcome: if outcome is 
unknown, the TTP executes steps T1 – T3 after a period of 4∆ time; otherwise, it responds to a message 
from PX with MTTP(X) or AbortTTP(X), if outcome is resolved or aborted respectively. This modification 
permits a recovered PX to terminate. Note that when TTP sets outcome to resolved or aborted, it is 
irreversible. 
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4.1.1. Impossibility of making P1 Crash-tolerant 
Even with the use of pessimistic logging and state-keeping TTP, P1 cannot become crash-tolerant even if 
the dishonest user is a restricted abuser. Consider the following scenario. Let NA crash during the second 
round shown in figure 2 and before PA receives AckB(A); that is, PA has logged IA, ΠA, sending of MA, 
and MB. Let dishonest UB block all messages PA sent to PB but retains a copy of these incoming messages. 
PB, having received no message from PA within 2∆ time, will send ReqB for which TTP will respond by 
setting outcome = aborted and sending AbortTTP(B). Say UB blocks AbortTTP(B) as well and crashes his 
node. The recovered PA will find itself in having received only MB and will send ResA which, say, 
reaches TTP after outcome was set to aborted; TTP’s response will be to send AbortTTP(A) to PA. Let UB 
re-boot NB, delete ΠB from stable-store, and adjust the clock to make it appear as if the exchange phase is 
being executed for the first time. He replays the arrival of ΠB and of the blocked messages of PA exactly 
at those instances when they arrived during the first execution. Since PB ‘receives’ both MA and AckA(B), 
it delivers IA to UB. 
4.1.1. Outline of Protocol P2 
At the core of P1’s inability to be crash tolerant is the fact that having both MA and AckA(B) is a 
sufficient condition for PB to deliver IA without consulting TTP at all. To remedy this, we need to add one 
more round (shown in Fig. 4) to protocol P1 which PX executes after having executed the first two rounds 
(concurrently) and check-pointed its state. (The code and correctness reasoning are given in Appendix 
A1.) In the third round, PA sends a second acknowledgement Ack2A(B) to PB indicating the reception of 
AckB(A) and MB.  
PBPA Ack
2
A(B) PBAck
2
B(A)PA
MB MA
Round 3
Ack B(A) Ack A(B)
 
Figure 4. Additional message round for P2.  
 
If PA does not receive Ack2B(A) within 2∆ time after it has sent Ack2A(B), PA appeals to TTP by sending 
First_AcksA that contains both AckA(B) and AckB(A). TTP, after receiving First_AcksA, sends 
Ack2TTP(A) to PA only if it has not earlier received ReqA (which would have resulted in sending 
AbortTTP(B) to PB). Thus, the condition for normal termination of PA is: received(Ack2ZA(A)), where 
ZA∈{B, TTP}. By symmetry, the condition for normal termination of PB is: received(Ack2ZB(B)), where 
ZB ∈{A, TTP}. Three messages used in addition to those used in P1 are shown in Table 2. 
 
Ack2A(B)=(L, A,  H(N), H(AckB(A)), My_ack2); 
A→ B 
Ack2B(A)=(L, B,  H(N), H(AckA(B)), My_ack2); 
B → A 
First_AcksA = (L, A, H(N), AckA(B), AckB(A)); 
A → TTP 
First_AcksB = (L, B, H(N), AckB(A), AckA(B)); 
B → TTP 
Ack2TTP(A) = (L, TTP,  H(N),  H(AckA(B)), 
My_ack2); TTP → A 
Ack2TTP(B) = (L, TTP, H(N), H(AckB(A)), 
My_ack2);          TTP → B 
Table 2. Description of additional messages used in P2. 
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4.2. Malicious Abuser, Synchronous Communication (P2.1) 
Protocol P2.1 is the same as P2, except that some of the messages used need to be changed:  
1. ΠA, MA, MTTP(A), ΠB, MB, and MTTP(B) of Table 1 change as mentioned in Section 3.2. AckA(B) 
and AckB(A) remain exactly as shown in Table 1. 
2. In Table 2, My_ack = KB in Ack2B(A) and in Ack2TTP(A); similarly, My_ack = KA in Ack2A(B) 
and Ack2TTP(B). 
Remark: Extension to Asynchronous Communication model. P2 and P2.1 work correctly in the 
asynchronous model if TTP computes ∆ during the start-up phase as described for P1A and P1.1A.  
4.3. Malicious and Restricted Abusers, Asynchronous Communication, on-line TTP (P2A and 
P2.1A)  
These protocols are obtained by making P1A and P1.1A crash-tolerant by having process PX 
pessimistically checkpoint its state (as in P2 and P2.1) before processing a received message and by 
making TTP state-keeping. The latter is done as follows: for any message received from PX after TEX + 
4∆, TTP sends AckY(X) to PX if both AckA(B) and AckB(A) have been received before TEX + 4∆; 
otherwise it sends AbortTTP(X).  
4.4. Summary 
Table 3 summarises the protocols’ characteristics using notations:  a dishonest user, (DU) who can be 
either a restricted abuser (RA) or a malicious abuser (MA), the communication delay model (C) can be 
synchronous (S) or asynchronous (As), faults tolerated (FT) can be none (No) or crash (Cr), and the TTP 
which can be either off-line (Off) or on-line (On), and either state-relinquishing (Sr) or state-keeping 
(Sk).  
Protocol DU C FT TTP 
P1 RA S No Off/Sr 
P1.1 MA S No Off/Sr 
P1A(P1.1A) RA(MA) As No On/Sr 
P2 RA S(As) Cr Off/Sk 
P2.1 MA S(As) Cr Off/Sk 
P2A(P2.1A) RA(MA) As Cr On/Sk 
Table 3. Characteristics of Protocols Developed. 
5. Restricting Abuse 
Our restricted abuser model requires that a dishonest user be prevented from extracting encryption keys 
(KA and KB) and from modifying verification procedure (VA or VB) that are embedded in the code 
supplied by the TTP. Here we show that how this requirement can be met using the smartcard technology 
and a protocol of Shoup and Rubin [SR96] designed for secure generation of session keys for distributed 
processes. This protocol assumes the availability of a TTP and allows PA and PB to obtain (at the end of a 
protocol execution) a shared symmetric key from their respective user’s smartcard. Restricting a 
dishonest user would then mean that the key generated by the smartcards are given to PA and PB 
encrypted with the card’s hard-wired long-term key. This means that the cards have to perform some 
protocol-specific cryptographic operations; more precisely, PA and PB execute those operations of 
protocols P1 and P2 which involve the use of KA and KB, by invoking operations on their local smartcard 
with an appropriate set of parameters which include the encrypted session key. The modification on 
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Shoup and Rubin’s protocol – which has been proven correct and implemented [J_98] – is thus very 
minimal; specifically, the smartcard is preserved to be a stateless probabilistic device.  
Figure 5 depicts the Smartcard-based Fair-Exchange system. Each node NX is attached to a smartcard 
device to interact with the smartcard CX of user UX. We assume that the communication between PX and 
the local smartcard device is tamper-proof and synchronous, and that the devices are reliable. We also 
assume, similar to [SR96], that a smartcard CX has a hardwired, long-term key K1X which is shared only 
with the TTP. A restricted abuser is assumed not to be able to crack any of these long-term keys stored in 
his card nor to correctly guess the session key from the encrypted form that is supplied to him. 
Recall that in protocols P1 and P2, TTP sends ΠA to PA which contains: L, N, VA, ∆, KA, and KB. In the 
smartcard-based system, L, N, and ∆ remain the same; instead of VA, V1A = eK1A(L, H(N), UA, VA) is sent 
(V1A is (L, H(N), UA, VA) encrypted with K1A); and, the information necessary for PA to execute Shoup-
Rubin protocol is sent in place of KA and KB. PA (and PB) execute the protocol and obtain K2A from CA 
(and K2B from CB). The received key K2A (respectively K2B) is the session key K which CA (also CB) 
generates as per Shoup-Rubin protocol, encrypted with K1A (respectively with K1B). (We note here that 
none of the steps in Shoup-Rubin protocol requires PX to know or use K itself). Note also that since the 
TTP knows K1A and K1B, it can obtain K from either K2A or K2B. Thus, the logical TTP, comprising the 
actual TTP and the smartcard devices (see figure 5), provides all the information which the TTP sends to 
PA and PB in protocols P1 and P2. 
NA 
TTP 
PA 
NB 
PB 
UA 
Communication 
subsystem 
CA 
UB 
CB 
Logical TTP 
Communication 
subsystem 
 
Figure 5. Smartcard Based Fair-Exchange System.  
The smartcard CA supports three operations namely verify_local(), verify_remote(), and decrypt() for PA 
to have IA verified and MA constructed, to verify the received MB and to decrypt MB, respectively: 
verify_local():    PA → CA: (K2A, V1A, IA); /* note: V1A = eK1A(L, H(N), UA, VA).      
     CA → PA: MA = eK(L, H(N), UA, VA, IA), if VA(IA); 
verify_remote():  PA → CA: (K2A, MΒ); CA → PA:  ackA = eK(L, H(N), UB, OK) if VB(IB); 
decrypt():    PA → CA: (K2A, V1A, MΒ, ackB) or (K2A, V1A, MΒ, ackTTP);         
     CA → PA : IB; 
The TTP computes ackTTP for PA as eK1A(L, H(N), UA, OK) and ackTTP for PB as eK1B(L, H(N), UB, OK), 
and uses it in place of My_ack and My_ack2 in protocols P1 and P2 respectively. PA uses ackA in place of 
My_ack and My_ack2 in protocols P1 and P2 respectively, and includes K2A in all its messages to the TTP 
(e.g., ResA, ReqA, First_AcksA). 
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In the decrypt() operation, CA checks if: the first two fields {L, H(N)} of MB and  of ackB or (ackTTP), and 
the first three fields {L, H(N), UA}of V1A, and of ackB or (ackTTP) are identical. 
6. Conclusions and Related Work 
We have used smartcards to realise our restricted abuser model. Our smartcards are stateless probabilistic 
devices. Vogt et. al., developed a fair-exchange protocol [VPG01] using smartcards as stateful, trusted 
computing platforms. For example, a smartcard should be able to send signed messages describing its 
state and be able to authenticate the signed messages it receives.  
Message Delay Model and on-line TTP vs. off-line TTP. Liu et. al. [LNJ00] proposes a criterion for 
incorporating crash-tolerance into a non-fault-tolerant protocol by semantics-based message logging 
scheme which optimises the number of messages that need to be pessimistically (synchronously) logged. 
The proposed approach is claimed to work for both on-line and off-line TTP based protocols. To 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach, they have considered a protocol with an on-line and state-
keeping TTP; this protocol is identical to our P1.1A except that the communication model is taken to be 
synchronous. In Section 4.1.1, we have shown that the synchronous, offline-TTP protocol P1 cannot be 
made crash-tolerant merely by pessimistic message logging even if TTP is state-keeping and a dishonest 
user is a restricted abuser. Another round of message exchange (see figure 4) between user processes was 
required. This illustrates that message logging alone cannot necessarily make a synchronous protocol 
crash-tolerant; if a non-fault-tolerant protocol keeps the TTP off-line (as P1 does), then whether the 
message delay model is synchronous or asynchronous is an important factor that must be considered. The 
claim that their approach is orthogonal to the underlying delay model (see section 6.2 of [LNJ00]) is true 
only for online-TTP protocols, and does not hold when TTP is off-line. 
On-line TTP:  state-relinquishing vs. state-keeping. Can an online-TTP protocol be made crash-tolerant 
simply through message logging, regardless of whether the delay model is synchronous or asynchronous? 
The answer depends on whether the non-fault-tolerant protocol keeps the TTP state-relinquishing or 
state-keeping. Our protocols P1A and P1.1A suggest that it is possible to design online-TTP protocols 
that keep TTP state-relinquishing even with asynchronous delays. In making them crash-tolerant, we 
have to make the (on-line) TTP a state-keeping one (see P2A and P2.1A in Table 3). Thus, the answer to 
the above question is yes, provided the issue of state-relinquishing vs. state-keeping TTP is given due 
consideration. 
Optimising the cost of message logging. The approach suggested by [LNJ00] is as follows. It defines the 
point of no return for a user process, and if the process would synchronously log all received messages 
before entering this point, then logging of other received messages can be done asynchronously. Their 
definition of point of no return suggests that there is only one such point for each process (Section 3.2 of 
[LNJ00]). We remark here that our protocol P2.1 without check-pointing and message logging is 
identical to the time-optimal protocol (scheme 3) of [PSW98] which is non-fault-tolerant, for the 
asynchronous delay model. Applying the proposed approach to make this protocol crash-tolerant does not 
work: the point of no return for honest PA turns out to be its sending MA to PB (see figure 2, round 1); 
suppose that NA crashes in round 3 (see figure 4) after PA has sent Ack2A(B) but before AckB(A) and MB 
were to be logged by the asynchronous logging scheme; note that Ack2A(B) contains KA (see Section 4.2). 
Honest UA suffers loss of fairness, even if UB does not misbehave; to avoid loss of fairness, PA must also 
log all received messages before sending Ack2A(B). It appears that some protocols can have multiple 
points at which pessimistic logging is essential. Given that the number of messages received by a user 
process in a given execution is small, attempts to minimise the overhead of logging may not be worth the 
effort after all; further, every message received (and logged) may be useful later in any dispute 
resolution.  
The work by [LNJ00] proposes a logging-based approach to achieving crash-tolerant fair-exchange. It 
defines a point of no return for a user process, and claims that if the process would synchronously log all 
received messages before entering this point, then logging of other received messages can be done 
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asynchronously. Their definition of point of no return suggests that there is only one such point for each 
process (Section 3.2 of [LNJ00]). We remark here that our protocol P2.1 without check-pointing and 
message logging is identical to the time-optimal protocol (scheme 3) of [PSW98] which is asynchronous 
and non-fault-tolerant. Applying the approach of [LNJ00] to make this protocol crash-tolerant does not 
work: the point of no return for honest PA turns out to be its sending MA to PB (see figure 2, round 1); 
suppose that NA crashes in round 3 (see Figure 4) after PA has sent Ack2A(B) but before AckB(A) and MB 
were to be logged by the asynchronous logging scheme; note that Ack2A(B) contains KA (see Section 4.2). 
Honest UA suffers loss of fairness, even if UB does not misbehave; to avoid loss of fairness, PA must also 
log all received messages before sending Ack2A(B). It appears that some protocols can have multiple 
points at which pessimistic logging is essential. Given that the number of messages received by a user 
process in a given execution is small, attempts to minimise the overhead of logging may not be worth the 
effort after all; further, every message received (and logged) may be useful later in any dispute 
resolution. 
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Appendix A1: Restricted Abuser, Synchronous and Crash-tolerant Protocol (P2) 
The program executed by PA has two parts as shown below. The first part is the concurrent execution of the first two 
rounds (see Figure 2) and the second contains the third round of Figure 4. Note that PA check-points its state before 
executing Part 2 to ensure that if it completes part 1 without receiving any message from PB and then crashes, it will 
know during recovery that it had already completed part 1. This in turn eliminates the following behaviour of PA: it 
completes part 1, sends ReqA to TTP in part 2, and crashes; after recovery, it re-executes part 1, receives delayed 
messages MB and/or AckB(A), and sends to TTP in part 2 a message different to ReqA.  
PA: 
begin {  
/* PART 1 
 /* concurrent execution of the first two rounds with timer set to 2∆;  
/* PART 2 
 check-point state; 
if received(MB) and received(AckB(A)) then 
{ send Ack2A(B) to PB; timer = 2∆; timed_receive(Ack2B(A)); 
if received(Ack2B(A))then Terminate(Ack2B(A)) 
else {send First_AcksA to TTP; receive(M) from TTP; Terminate(M);} 
  } 
 else if received(MB) then  
   {send ResA to TTP; receive(M) from TTP; Terminate(M);} 
 else {send ReqA to TTP; receive(M) from TTP; Terminate(M);} 
 } end; 
Figure A1.1. Pseudo-code executed by PA in protocol P2. 
Protocol for TTP 
Figure A1.2 presents the code for (an off-line) TTP in two parts. Part 1 contains steps T1 – T4 described in Section 
3.1 and the second part makes TTP a state-keeping one. To this end, three Boolean variables resolved(L, H(N)), 
abortedA(L, H(N)), and abortedB(L, H(N)) are maintained. (For brevity, the qualifier (L, H(N)) will be omitted in 
subsequent descriptions.) The code shown assumes that TTP responds to user process messages until it agrees to a 
re-execution of the protocol which will set variable active_run# (L) for exchange L to a new nonce (see section 
2.5.2) in the start-up phase of the next execution. 
TTP: 
 begin { 
  // stable predicates: 
 boolean resolved(L, H(N)) = false; // becomes true once the exchange is resolved 
 boolean abortedA(L, H(N)) = false; // becomes true once abort token is given to PA 
boolean abortedB(L, H(N)) = false; // becomes true once abort token is given to PB 
 /* PART 1: 
when (clock = TEX) do { 
send ΠA to PA; send ΠB to PB; Set_of_M M_BagL = { }; 
repeat {receive(M); deposit M in M_BagL;} until clock < TEX+ 4∆; 
  if  M_BagL ≠ { }  
    then { if ((received(ReqA) and (received(ReqB)))  
      then {send MTTP(A) to PA; send MTTP(B) to PB; 
resolved(L, H(N)) = true; }  
    }; 
 } /* end do 
 /* PART 2 (making TTP state-keeping) 
repeat  
{ receive {M}; 
 case M of 
  ReqX: 
{if (resolved(L, H(N))) then send MTTP(X) to PX 
   else {send AbortTTP(X) to PX; abortedX(L, H(N)) = true;} } 
  ResX: 
{if (not abortedA(L, H(N)) and not abortedB(L, H(N)))  
 then {send MTTP(X) to PX; resolved(L, H(N)) = true;}     
 else {send AbortTTP(X) to PX; abortedX(L, H(N)) = true;} } 
  First_AcksX: 
{if (abortedX(L, H(N)))  
then send AbortTTP(X) to PX; 
else send Ack2TTP(X) to PX;} 
  
endcase; } //  
  } until active_run#(L) ≠ N; 
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} end; 
Figure A1.2. Pseudo-code for TTP in protocol P2. 
Note that the Boolean variables resolved, abortedA, and abortedB are stable predicates: once they become true, they 
remain true forever during an execution. Important points to note are: a distinct aborted variable is maintained for 
each PX, and TTP’s response to a First_AcksX received depends on whether abortedX is true or not. They are used in 
correctness arguments below.  
Correctness Argument for Protocol Properties: 
It is easy to see that P2 meets the termination, non-repudiation and non-triviality guarantees, if the assumption on D 
(same as ∆) holds. We will show that it also preserves the No_loss_of_fairness property despite crashes of an honest 
user node. Suppose that UA is honest and PA terminates exceptionally. We will argue that UB could not have received 
IA so long as UB cannot deduce KA, KB and VB embedded in ΠB. Let us first make two observations:  
(i) Booleans received(MB), received(AckB(A)) and received(Ack2B(A)) are stable predicates, and 
(ii) PA does not send different messages (e.g., ReqA and then ResA) to the TTP in a given execution, 
irrespective of the number its node crashes in that execution. 
Suppose that PA terminates exceptionally. It can do so only by receiving an abort token from the TTP in response to 
its sending ReqA, ResA, or First_AcksA.  
• Say, PA sent ReqA. This means that PB cannot send First_AcksB to the TTP. When ReqA reached 
TTP, resolved must be false; that is, the TTP could not have earlier resolved the exchange nor will resolve it 
in response to receiving ReqB in future. Further, when TTP sends the abort token, it sets the abortedA to true 
which is never set back to false. Therefore, the TTP will not resolve any of PB’s ResB in future. So, PB cannot 
deliver IA to UB. 
• Say, PA sent ResA. When ResA reached the TTP, abortedB must be true, otherwise, the TTP would 
have resolved the exchange. This means that PB had already been given an abort token, and that the TTP’s 
response for any future First_AcksB will be an abort token as well.  
• Suppose that PA sent First_AcksA. When TTP receives First_AcksA, abortedA must already be true. 
The code of TTP indicates that if TTP sets abortedX to true, then it must have received ReqX or ResX. We 
have shown that PA checkpointing its state at the end of part 1 of its code forbids it from sending ReqA or ResA 
and then First_AcksA. So, PA could not have sent First_AcksA and then terminate exceptionally. 
Appendix A2: Using inverse and compatible keys in protocols P1.1 and P2.1 
UA and UB decide on the TTP in step 0.1 and obtain keys K0A and K0B respectively from the TTP which escrows the 
inverse keys K-10A and K-10B. 
The key pair {K, K-1} has this property: for any m, eK-1(eK(m)) = eK(eK-1(m)) = m. If keys K1 and K2 are 
compatible, then a product key K1×K2 can be obtained with the following properties:  
(i) There exist two large numbers N1 and N2 such that:           
 eK1×K2(m)  ≡ eK1(µ) mod N1 if and only if m = µ; and,        
 eK1×K2(m)  ≡ eK2(µ) mod N2 if and only if m = µ; 
(ii) m can be obtained from eK1×K2(m)  using K1-1 or K2-1 if N1 and N2 are known. 
As in [RRN00], N1 and N2 are assumed to be publicly known. We refer the reader to that paper for detailed treatment 
on inverse and compatible keys. Below, we state the five protocol modifications for PA. 
• PA approaches its TA with K0A which returns SigTA_A(VA, ΣA) with VA = eK0A(IA). (See section 2.5.2.) 
• It does not receive KA from the TTP but generates it to be compatible with K0A. 
• ΦA = eK0A×KA(IA). PA verifies if ΦB (received in MB) and VB (received in the set-up phase) are encryptions 
of the same data item. 
• In protocol P1.1, PA uses K-1A in place of My_ack, and in P2.1 in place of My_ack2. 
• In protocol P1.1, the TTP uses K-10B in place of My_ack of MTTP(A), and in P2.1 in place of My_ack2 of 
Ack2TTP(A). 
 
